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In 2005 India and the United States (US) announced a nuclear 'deal' whereby India's
ambiguous status in the nuclear order was sought to be clarified. The sole superpower
appeared to be recognizing India's status as a nuclear-armed state by opening up the
possibility of nuclear co-operation. This announcement represented the fruit of many
years of careful Indian diplomacy aimed at establishing its identity as a responsible
possessor of nuclear weapons and forging a closer alliance with the US. This paper
provides a concise description of the provisions of the 2005 India-US nuclear
agreement, and analyzes its global, regional and domestic implications.
The paper argues that while the nuclear deal, like most other events, was the product
of a convergence of circumstances (such as the ideological orientation of the
administration in the White House and the recent revelations about nuclear transfers
out of Pakistan), the main enabling condition was India’s strategy constituting itself as
a responsible nuclear power. The paper highlights the power of the concept of
‘responsibility’ which the Indian government has repeatedly made reference to. It will
conclude by comparing the policy options available to the Canadian government in
responding to this deal.
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In July 2005, the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh was welcomed to the
White House with a state banquet, and on 18 July 2005 a Joint Statement was issued
by Singh and US President George W. Bush. The statement contains various
expressions of common interest and pledges the two governments to work together on
counter-terrorism, economic and environmental issues. It also declares that “as a
responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same
benefits and advantages as other such states” (emphasis mine). Many took this to
mean that the US had accepted India’s self-declared status as a Nuclear Weapon State
(NWS).
Just over seven years earlier, Bush’s predecessor President Bill Clinton had reacted to
the news of India’s nuclear tests with dismay. After ordering the explosion of five
nuclear devices in the Rajasthan desert in the summer of 1998, the then Prime Minister
Vajpayee had declared “India is now a Nuclear Weapon State”. Clinton had described
the tests as putting India “on the wrong side of history” and “at odds with the
international community”, which was working towards nuclear arms control.
In 2005, however, it seemed that India had emerged on the right side of the
nonproliferation regime. It had left its undefined and worrisome past behind and was
now entering a new era with a validated nuclear identity. The next section will
examine how India managed to pull off this feat. First, I briefly outline the features of
the India-US nuclear cooperation agreement. Section Three deals with the incentives
on the part of the US and Section Four discusses the global implications of the nuclear
deal. In Section Five I take up the regional and in Section Six the domestic
consequences. In the concluding section I discuss the policy alternatives available to
Canada as it reviews its nuclear policy towards India.
Section One: The India-US agreement
The most significant part of the agreement, obviously, is the statement above by the
US President that appears to acknowledge India as a de facto Nuclear Weapon State
(NWS). As per article IX of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, countries that
exploded a nuclear device before 1 January 1967 are NWS and all other states are Non
Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Thus, the US, the Soviet Union (now Russia), the
United Kingdom, France and China are the only legitimate NWS.
India was the first country to test a nuclear device after the NPT’s identification of a
nuclear explosion as the prerequisite for NWS status. However, since its 1974
explosion was presented to the world as a ‘peaceful’ explosion, unrelated to the
development of weapons, this first test did not challenge the global nuclear order in
the same way as the 1998 tests and the subsequent self-proclamation of NWS status. It
is important to note that Indian authorities have not pressed the issue of recognition in
the international arena. Instead, they have been waging a quiet and concerted
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diplomatic campaign to win over support for India’s entry into the global nuclear order
as one of the nuclear ‘haves’.
The US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns was careful to refute the
implications that the 2005 agreement would have for India’s status: “By taking this
decision, we are not recognizing India as a nuclear weapons state. We are simply
opening up a channel in order to co-operate on a commercial basis and a technological
basis on nuclear power itself and that’s a very important distinction. ..”1. However, the
logic of the deal only holds together if India, at the very least, approximates to a NWS.
How can one, for example, assert that India is a NNWS while recognizing that it
operates both civilian and military nuclear fuel cycles2?
The agreement provides that over the next eight years, the Indian government will
identify 14 out of its 22 currently functioning reactors as ‘civilian’ and render them
subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). New
reactors, when commissioned, could also be declared as civilian at the discretion of the
Indian government. It is of marked significance that it is the Indian government that
will be making the determination of the civilian status of the reactors. It also retains
the right to move reactors from one list on to another. As and when the government
decides to move a reactor from the military onto the civilian list, scientists would have
to discharge all the spent fuel that it contains and re-fuel it entirely with fresh imported
fuel. The Additional Protocol agreement that India and the IAEA would negotiate is
similar to the voluntary accords that the five NWS have entered into with that
organization. Such an accord would allow India to exclude military-related facilities
and even certain portions of civilian facilities on ‘national security’ grounds.
India also pledged to continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, but has not
promised to stop producing plutonium. The proposed separation of nuclear reactors
into civilian and military would not reduce India’s existing nuclear stockpile or limit
its potential growth. In fact, granting India access to world nuclear markets and
allowing it to purchase uranium would enable the government to divert indigenously
produced fuel from currently ‘peaceful’ uses (electricity generation) to the production
of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons.
Furthermore, the nascent Fast Breeder Reactor program has been kept out of the
purview of international safeguards. The Fast Breeder Thermal reactors are part of the
country’s ambitious three-stage plan for nuclear expansion. In the first stage, these
reactors (currently there are two) would be fueled with depleted uranium-plutonium
fuel. They would produce low enriched uranium which would then be used in thorium
1

“Briefing on the Signing of the Global Partnership Agreement Between the United States and India”,
19 July 2005, www.state.gov
2
Ronald Stansfield, “The Impact of the US-India Joint Statement for Canadian and International
Nuclear Non-proliferation Efforts”, in Wade Huntley and Karthika Sasikumar (eds.), Nuclear
Cooperation with India (Vancouver: Simons Centre for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Research,
2006), 39.
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breeder reactors. If this plan is successful, it would allow India to achieve nuclear selfsufficiency as it is rich in thorium reserves, but since they also produce large quantities
of weapons-grade plutonium as a by-product, foreign observers view these reactors
with suspicion.
For its part, the US promises to “amend domestic laws and to work with friends and
allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary
conditions for India to obtain full access to the international market for nuclear fuel,
including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in
several nations. To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies for India,
assurances regarding fuel supply would be part of a bilateral US-India agreement, the
US pledged to support India in its negotiations with the IAEA, and in its effort to
develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel. If despite these arrangements, a disruption
of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a
group of friendly supplier countries to pursue such measures as would restore fuel
supply to India”3.
On 26 September 2006, the Canadian Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew also
announced that Canada was willing to resume trade with India in dual-use nuclear
technologies without infringing on the rules of the NSG or the IAEA. An agreement to
cooperate on nuclear safety measures was adopted4.
Section Two: India’s strategy of responsibility
From 1999 to 2001, the Indian government which at that time was headed by the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), held talks with the US State Department representative
Strobe Talbott on the nuclear issue. As Talbott himself admitted, he was outdone in
diplomacy by the Indians5. In 2004, a 14–party coalition called the United Progressive
Alliance, headed by the Congress party came to power in New Delhi, and continued
these negotiations. In this section I examine the use of international norms as
‘resources’ by the Indian authorities in constructing India as a responsible nuclear
power.
Responsible nuclear policy
Even before the 1998 tests, Indian leaders had made much of the responsible and
restrained character of the nuclear program. In fact, this responsible character was
cited as the reason that they were refraining from testing and weaponisation. After
May 1998, restraint became the cornerstone of nuclear diplomacy. This was expressed
in two ways. First, the government turned its back on decades of public opposition to

3

Suo Moto Statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the Indian Parliament, 7 March 2006.
“Canada Announces New Areas of Cooperation with India”, 26 September 2005, http://news.gc.ca
5
Aziz Haniffa, “Jaswant Achieved More of His Objectives than I”, 21 September 2004,
www.rediff.com
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deterrence as an evil doctrine and affirmed its commitment to using nuclear weapons
solely as deterrents. Second, India tried to present its crisis behavior as responsible.
With all the fervor of the new convert, India pledged its commitment to responsible
deterrence, and abjured the use of nuclear weapons to change the status quo. The
Prime Minister declared in a statement shortly after the 1998 tests: “Our intentions
were, are, and always will be peaceful, but we do not want to cover our action with a
veil of needless ambiguity”. India declared it would be content with a “minimum”
nuclear deterrent and promised that unlike other nuclear weapon powers, it did not
intend to build a large arsenal or create an elaborate command and control system. It
would induct nuclear weapons into the armed forces only if necessary and there was
no time frame in which this process would be completed6. In fact, it is thanks to
nuclear deterrence, which does not depend on matching weapon to weapon, that India
would avoid an arms race7.
In this vein, the backers of the deal point out that India has not, until now, shown any
great desire to accelerate the production of nuclear arms. If it had been intent on
constructing a large arsenal, it would have already done so. Therefore, there is no
danger that the fissile material floodgates to the weapons program would be opened by
allowing India to become a consumer in the global nuclear market8.
Nuclear restraint has also been integral to military-diplomatic strategy. In May 1999,
for example, the Indian army detected intrusions in the Kargil sector on the border
with Pakistan. India successfully made the case to the international community that
Pakistan had supported a terrorist incursion. India managed to clear the sector of all
intruders at the cost of over a thousand lives. Pakistan’s greatest defeat, however, was
the near-universal condemnation of its role. The US, marking a dramatic departure
from its traditional tilt towards Pakistan, pressured it to rein in the insurgents.
Similarly, the attack on Parliament in New Delhi on 13 December 2001 by terrorists
allegedly supported by Pakistan triggered a military response on the Indian side,
followed by Pakistani mobilization. The two armies faced off across the border until
June 2002. As in 1999, India was more successful than Pakistan in gaining world
sympathy, especially as the assault came a few months after the al-Qaeda attacks on
the US.
However, while surveys showed widespread public support in India for attacks on
terrorist camps and hot pursuit across the de facto border, the government eschewed
these options. This restraint, in contrast with Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to
control jihadis on its territory, was repeatedly parlayed into diplomatic gain. National
Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra said: “The recent operations in Kargil have
6

“Fernandes for campaign against N-weapons”, 13 May 1998, Indian Express.
Jasjit Singh, “Press for Total Disarmament”, 4 June 1998, Indian Express.
8
Ashley Tellis, Atoms for War? US- Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal.
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2006); “Indian Official Defends Nuclear Deal”, 31 March
2006, www.nti.org.
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demonstrated that our system and the political leadership believe in great
responsibility and restraint, as you would expect from the largest democracy in the
world”9. While India’s stance during Kargil marked it as a mature country, Western
fears of nuclear escalation boomeranged on Pakistan. India’s identity as a victim of
terrorism has enabled it to shift the terms of the security discourse towards a greater
emphasis on its concerns, with India’s Foreign Minister even alleging that the US was
paying too much attention to nonproliferation and not enough to terrorism10. It is
important to note that at the meeting with Canadian Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew
in September 2005 leading to the declaration on nuclear issues, the other substantive
issue that was discussed was counter-terrorism.
Responsible proliferation
One can argue that there is nothing responsible about holding entire populations
hostage, but the equation of deterrence with stability has meant that, in the global
nonproliferation order, responsible behavior is equated with strict controls on the
diffusion of nuclear technology outside national boundaries. In stark contrast to China
and Pakistan—a contrast that Indian diplomats have played up—India has kept a tight
rein on its considerable nuclear expertise. Soon after the 1998 tests it was announced
that India, “as a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons” was tightening export
controls11. Addressing the US Congress in 2005, Prime Minister Singh said: "I would
reiterate that India’s track record in nuclear non-proliferation is impeccable. We have
adhered scrupulously to every rule and canon in this area. We have done so even
though we have witnessed unchecked nuclear proliferation in our own neighbourhood,
which has directly affected our security interests. We have never been, and will never
be, a source of proliferation of sensitive technologies".
Traditionally Indian diplomats had insisted that nonproliferation was discriminatory
and inadequate. But after 1998, moving away from the traditional goal of general and
comprehensive disarmament, India began advocating clearly incremental
nonproliferation or counter-proliferation measures, such as a resolution on reducing
the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, and a global No First
Use pact. In 2002 India joined the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material. Most importantly, the government proclaimed its willingness to sign
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and enter negotiations on a Fissile Materials
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Although India objects to the NPT on the grounds that it does
not reduce the weapons already existing in NWS arsenals, it is now ready to sign an
FMCT which only restricts further production and does not operate with retroactive
effect to reduce stockpiles of material. Further, while India is not currently a full
9

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “India’s Nuclear Use Doctrine”, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and
James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Weapons ( Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 145.
10
Jaswant Singh’s Interview with El Mundo, 17 February 2002, in Official Statements of the
Government of India on Terrorism and Related Matters (New Delhi: Government of India, 2002)
11
C. Rajamohan, “PM Rejects Demand to Limit Nuclear Capabilities”, Hindu, 16 December 1998.
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fledged member of the Proliferation Security Initiative it participates in its less
controversial components.
That India’s policy of supporting restrictions on the diffusion of nuclear material has
succeeded is proven by a close look at the statement by Nicholas Burns at the official
Briefing on the Signing of the Global Partnership Agreement:“…India has a record of
nonproliferation, which is exceptional; very strong commitment to protection of fissile
material, other nuclear materials and nuclear technology; and there's a transparency
about the Indian Government's program, which has been very welcomed”.
Sustaining development
The rhetoric of industrial development has been used to garner support for the nuclear
program in India. ‘Development’ was not merely a cover for the use of a civilian
nuclear program for other purposes. The idea that nuclear energy would spur
development is still alive, although the official economic orientation has shifted from
state-directed capital-intensive development to export-oriented growth led by the
private sector. While earlier, Indians claimed that indigenous nuclear projects were
essential for self-sufficiency, currently opportunities for international co-operation are
stressed in keeping with India’s image as an emerging market.
In his speech at the Carnegie Endowment, India’s then Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran
drew on the rhetoric of development to justify the nuclear agreement, foregrounding
his discussion of strategic issues with lengthy references to economic partnership,
more specifically, India’s growing stakes in a “knowledge-driven society”. The first
paragraph of the statement on the implementation of the India-US agreement firmly
situates the deal in the context of ensuring energy supply. The opening sentence reads:
“The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation between India and the
United States arose in the context of India’s requirement for adequate and affordable
energy supplies to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate and as recognition of
its growing technological prowess.”
In selling the agreement to the Indian public, the government has again played the
development card. In his statement to Parliament, Prime Minister Singh predicted:
“The scope for cooperation in the energy related research will vastly expand, so will
cooperation in nuclear research activities. India will be able to join the international
mainstream and occupy its rightful place among the top countries of the nuclear
community. There would be a quantum jump in our energy generating capacity with a
consequential impact on our GDP growth. It also ensures India’s participation as a full
partner in cutting edge multilateral scientific effort…”.
Democracy
Indian elites have made much of the fact that it is the world’s largest democracy. As
the US and its allies push for democratization in the Middle East and other troubled
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regions, India can point to over five decades of a surprisingly resilient democratic
experiment. While democracy has apparently very little to do with the legitimacy of
nuclear weapons—Russia and China obtaining international recognition as NWS
while they were not democratic—this factor is becoming increasingly important. We
only have to note the frequent references to, and denunciations of, the autocratic
regimes in Iran and North Korea when their nuclear programs are in question, to
understand the crucial role of Indian democracy in legitimizing its arsenal. Another
reason for India to strategically deploy its democratic form of government is that it
implies the civilian control of nuclear weapons, which is usually considered more
stable than military control. In fact, India separated its civilian and military plants
following the US model.
Section Three: American incentives
In the sections above, I have discussed the strategy of the Indian government and the
resources it deployed. In this section I describe the incentives on the part of the US
government, which also determined the form that the agreement has taken.
Recent Indian administrations have been assiduously cultivating military ties with the
US. India was one of the first countries to propose its participation in George W.
Bush’s planned missile defense system. Strategic ties were consolidated after the 9/11
attacks on the US, with India offering military support to the US invasion of
Afghanistan. More broadly, India intensified its campaign to reinforce the perception
of the links between Kashmiri and other secessionists with Islamic militancy in
general and with Al Qaeda in particular. India has successfully presented itself as a
victim of terrorism and thus a ‘natural ally’ of the US. Another strategic motivation for
the deal could be the American design to ‘contain’ China. Several commentators have
advocated helping India to consolidate its power as a hedge against revisionist
tendencies on the part of a rising China. Acknowledging its nuclear arsenal would be
an important preliminary step in initiating a joint effort to balance against China. A
few weeks before the nuclear deal was announced, India and the US signed a historic
military partnership. India is reportedly considering the purchase of $5 billion worth of
conventional military equipment from the US12. While common strategic goals could
have eased the path to the US’ acceptance of India’s arsenal, we must also remember
that India now figures on the mental map of US strategic planners mainly because it
has successfully portrayed itself as a responsible nuclear power.
Two other factors may have been important to American decision-makers. Pressure
groups have been putting out figures about the new jobs that would be created by the
deal13. It is also tempting to speculate about the unprecedented role of the Indian
diaspora in drumming up support for the deal. Groups of Indian-Americans affiliated
with both the Republicans and the Democrats have not hesitated to claim credit for
influencing votes in an election year.
12
13

Dafna Linzer, “Bush Officials Defend India Nuclear Deal”, Washington Post, 17 July 2005.
Aziz Haniffa, “'270,000 new jobs will be created': US industry”, 26 November 2006, www.rediff.com

Karthika Sasikumar
14 February 2007
Submission to International Journal

9

However, while economic motivations and pandering to Indian-American voters may
have swayed some politicians at the margins, the deal itself could not have come into
being without a solid ideological commitment by the present administration in
Washington DC. It is safe to say that no other US administration would have taken the
bold step of accepting India into the global nuclear order at such a low price. The
reigning orthodoxy on nuclear proliferation in the White House has been summarized
by analyst William Potter in three propositions: nuclear proliferation is inevitable,
there are good proliferators and bad proliferators, and multilateral mechanisms against
proliferation are ineffective14. India, a stable economically dynamic democracy that is
increasingly close to the US, does not pose a threat to international peace in this view,
and should be brought into the system by unilateral initiatives.
Nicholas Burns blandly admitted to a double standard: “We treat India, a democratic,
peaceful friend, differently than we treat Iran and North Korea and we’re very happy
to say that. India is inviting the IAEA in, Iran is pushing the IAEA out. India is
playing by the rules. Iran is not. If that’s a system of double standards, we’re very
proud to establish that double standard on behalf of a democratic friend”15.
The India-US nuclear deal as of the time of writing, does not include permanent and/or
facility-specific safeguards. The US does not retain the right to challenge India’s
distinction between military and civilian reactors, which is important because only the
latter would be subject to international inspection. In fact, press reports suggest that
the Bush administration did not try very hard to include these conditions. While his
negotiators were attempting to persuade their Indian counterparts to accede to the
demand for permanent safeguards, President Bush ended up endorsing the Indian
position that since India was interested in a permanent fuel supply, the safeguards
would in effect be permanent whether or not this was specified in the agreement16.
Section Four: Global implications
What are the major global consequences of new nuclear cooperation with India?
Technically, as India has never signed the NPT, the agreement with the US does not
violate international legal norms. The US State Department argued that: “Nothing in
the NPT, its negotiating history, or the practice of the parties supports the notion that
fuel supply to safeguarded reactors for peaceful purposes could be construed as
‘assisting in the manufacture of nuclear weapons’ for purposes of Article 1”17.

14

William C. Potter, “India and the New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy”, 8 March 2005,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050825.htm
15
David Ruppe, “U.S. Acknowledges “Double Standard” on Indian Deal”, 14 April 2006, www.nti.org
16
“Deal a Win-Win for India”, Hindu, 4 March 2006; Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph,
“Why Bush Blinked”, Times of India, 6 March 2006.
17
David Ruppe, “U.S.-Indian Deal Would Violate NPT, Critics Say”, 23 June 2006, www.nti.org
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However, there are three ways in which the recent overtures to India transgress
widely-held norms on nonproliferation. First, as explained above, the deal could end
up freeing India’s reactors for military purposes. Therefore, the deal could be seen as
an indirect violation of Article 1 of the NPT, which enjoins on all members the duty
not to “in any way … assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.”
Second, the deal goes against the spirit of international prohibitions on assistance to
countries engaged in developing nuclear weapons, and strengthens the impression that
the US is playing fast and loose with the nonproliferation regime. Since India has not
been categorized as one of the five Nuclear Weapon States by the NPT, its possession
of nuclear weapons has a highly precarious status in international law. Iran has been
quick to criticize this acquiescence towards India’s nuclear program and point to a
double standard18. Third, the deal seems to violate other international agreements that
are part of the nonproliferation regime, such as the export controls agreed on by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
At this point we can only speculate about the effect of the India-US nuclear agreement
on nonproliferation norms. The question to ask is: what lessons will other potential
nuclear states learn from India’s success story? On the one hand, they could conclude
that once countries acquire nuclear weapons, there is a strong incentive for the
international community to accept that as fait accompli. On the other hand, they could
learn a positive lesson—noting that India was treated differently from Pakistan and
North Korea and rewarded for nuclear restraint and responsible stewardship of its
arsenal. They could, consequently, be persuaded to sheath their nuclear arms in the
restraining envelope of adherence to international norms.
Aside from the consequences for nonproliferation, India-US nuclear cooperation
would be of interest to observers across the world for three other reasons. First, if
India is able to operate a full-fledged civil nuclear program with international aid, it
could become a model for other developing countries with growing energy needs.
Second, if India successfully exploits the opportunity to enter the global nuclear
market, it would ease the chronic electricity shortage which has constrained economic
growth. Moreover, it would reduce the harmful emissions produced by the burning of
fossil fuels. In fact, the US State Department has cited an interest in alleviating global
warming as one of the motives behind the deal. The real impact on global emissions is
of course a matter of speculation, but some preliminary calculations have been done.
Assuming that 20 GW of new nuclear capacity replacing the output of India’s coalfired plants, David Victor estimates 145 million fewer tonnes of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere. This is nearly as large as the entire commitment of 25 European Union

18

Pranab Dhal Samanta, “Iran picks on 'objectionable' Indo-US deal”, Indian Express, 6 March 2006
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nations under the Kyoto Protocol19. Third, nuclear cooperation would strengthen the
friendship between India and the US, the world’s largest democracies, with
implications for many aspects of international relations from counter-terrorism, to
United Nations reform, to global trade negotiations.
Section Five: Regional fallout
What can we predict about the strategic consequences of the nuclear deal in India’s
neighbourhood? It seems to stand to reason that the nuclear deal, especially when read
as a sign of increased closeness between India and the US, would escalate the arms
race between India and Pakistan. In April 2006, a Pakistani official asked that his
country receive access to the international nuclear market, and the next day, President
Musharraf revealed that he was negotiating a nuclear deal with China20. However,
Pakistani politicians know that realistically, there is little chance in the short term that
they would receive the same treatment as India. In March 2006, Condoleezza Rice
categorically ruled out a nuclear deal with Pakistan21.
Therefore, to counter the possibility that India would have access to a larger fissile
material stockpile once the deal comes into effect, Pakistan would have to find ways to
enhance its arsenal either qualitatively or quantitatively. It may be forced to search for
new technologies in the clandestine networks that it already has some experience with.
Such a quest would have dangerous ramifications for the entire nonproliferation
regime. One source that it would consider is China, which is suspected to have made
certain secret transfers of reactor design and components to Pakistan in the 1990s. A
leading Chinese daily in fact hinted that since the US was now reinterpreting the
nonproliferation norm, other countries have the right to do so22. The clear threat was
that China now has no incentive to stop transfers of nuclear or missile technology to
Pakistan.
China’s response to the nuclear deal will be closely watched. As discussed above, the
agreement was allegedly crafted to counter the rise of China. If China were to be
alarmed by the emerging US-India strategic partnership, we would expect its leaders
not only to forge stronger links with Pakistan, but also to ramp up their weapons
programs and to challenge US positions on a variety of issues. In turn, countries like
Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan would take fright and a vicious circle of
escalation would be set into motion.

19

David G. Victor, “The India Nuclear Deal: Implications for Global Climate Change, Testimony
before the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources”, 18 July 2006, www.
cesp.stanford.edu/news/nuclear_testimony
20
David Ruppe, op.cit., n. 15.
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On the bright side, this scenario is not the most likely. Indian leaders realize that
triggering an arms race would be disastrous for the country at this point in its growth
and China is similarly preoccupied with economic consolidation. India is not likely to
lend itself to being an American pawn in the region, and China’s common interests
with the US and its allies are only becoming more obvious. In November 2006, the
Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India and issued a joint declaration, which was
subtle but of enormous interest. On nuclear issues, it said: “the two sides agree to
promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, consistent with their respective
international commitments...international civilian nuclear cooperation should be
advanced through innovative and forward-looking approaches, while safeguarding the
effectiveness of international non-proliferation principles”. Observers have read this as
an acceptance of India’s nuclear bargain with the US and as a hint that China would
not oppose it when it is brought up before the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Section Six: Domestic repercussions
In this section I will summarize the reactions that these developments have elicited in
India. I will focus on three interested groups—strategic analysts, politicians, and the
technocrats in the nuclear program.
Although Prime Minister Singh assured Parliament that “strategic policies and assets
are a source of national security and will continue to be so, and will remain outside the
scope of our discussions with any external interlocutors”, some constituencies regard
the deal with the US as a surrender of India’s assets. Some strategic analysts feared it
would injure the delicate balance of opacity and transparency that grounds India’s
deterrent. Satish Chandra, a former member of the National Security Agency, worried
that other powers would be able to make better calculations about the number of
bombs India could produce as the size of its fissile material stockpiles would be easy
to estimate23. Others claimed that deterrence would not be compromised since the
“framework has not given any license for the US or the IAEA to probe into what we
are doing”24.
The previous government headed by the BJP had also been negotiating with the US on
the nuclear issue, but had not arrived at a deal. This does not stop the BJP from
criticizing the present government, with most of its criticism referring to the unequal
burder of commitments on India’s part25. These sentiments are also echoed by the Left
parties. Opposition politicians have also expressed concern about the effect of India’s
closeness to the US on its traditional foreign policy relationships. When India voted,
along with the US, to report Iran’s nuclear activities to the IAEA board, its long
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standing ally Iran expressed anger at India’s tacit support of American attempts to
divest it of its nuclear capability26.
Retired government scientists have expressed apprehensions about dependence on
foreign technology. As expected, the official reaction from India’s Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) was positive. Ashley Tellis lists the reasons why consummating
the agreement is important for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)
• it provides regularized access to imported natural uranium since domestic production
is hampered by the bottlenecks in its mining and milling infrastructure
• it permits the DAE’s commercial operating arm to import higher unit output reactors
which are more economical than the traditional low unit output facilities
• the ability to legally import brings with it the prospect of foreign financing, modern
safety technologies, and new advanced designs
• it enhances the DAE’s own ability to participate in the new global initiatives in
fusion research, waste management, and reactor design
• finally and perhaps most importantly, the agreement provides India with a structural
hedge in case the planned indigenous nuclear expansion program runs into trouble27.
India’s flagship energy thinktank, the Tata Energy Research Institute supported the
nuclear deal on account of its ability to provide cheap energy. At present, nuclear
power makes up only 3% of total power generated in India. The bulk of the supply
(55%) comes from coal burned in thermal power plants while hydroelectric power
contributes 26%. Speaking at a conference in Vancouver in 2005, nuclear expert M. V.
Ramana claimed, extrapolating from the AEC’s past performance, that we cannot
expect new nuclear inputs to satisfy India’s growing thirst for power. However, Seema
Gahlaut countered with the argument that isolation has contributed to the AEC’s
inefficiency, or at least has allowed it to make such a claim. Only time will tell
whether the infusion of new technology will make the AEC more competitive.
The July nuclear deal impinges on India’s energy policy in another way. Since 2004,
India has been negotiating with Iran on a natural gas pipeline that would transfer fuel
to India’s west coast. The 2670 kilometre long pipeline would pass through Pakistan.
The Bush administration expressed its disappointment at India’s cooperation with Iran,
a country that it considers part of the ‘axis of evil’. Instead, it has been encouraging
India to consider an alternative project, partly funded by the oil giant Unocal—the
Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan pipeline. American diplomats also made it clear to
their Indian counterparts that Congress would approve the July deal only if the Indians
were seen as cooperating with the US in their attempts to force Iran to give up its
uranium enrichment program. Thus in the crucial vote at the IAEA on 24 September
2005, on the question of referring Iran to the UN Security Council, India broke with
the nonaligned countries and voted along with the US. Iran responded immediately,
indicating the $21 billion gas pipeline was in jeopardy. This stance has since been
softened. However, the question remains: can India afford to antagonize Iran? If Iran
26
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does withdraw from the pipeline project, will the shortfall in fuel supplies be made up
by the US-supported project or by nuclear energy?
There were critics within India who saw the deal as yet another nail in the coffin of
nonproliferation. But they were definitely in the minority, as even those elites who
were not attentive to nuclear developments perceived the agreement as a recognition
of the growing global status of their country. The effect of the agreement has been to
strengthen the position of those who advocate a pro-Western foreign policy and
globalization in economic policy. Kanti Bajpai has suggested that greater closeness
with the US in fact signals a shift of power away from the foreign policy establishment
in favor of the military 28.
A short note about the latest developments in US politics and their impact on the
chances of the deal’s success: at the start, members of the US Congress were upset
with the deal, for the simple reason that the Bush administration had not taken pains to
keep senior Congresspersons informed. The deal was sprung on Congress as a “done
deal’ just as it had been sprung on the rest of the world. The deal was cooked up by
Robert Blackwill, ambassador to India during Bush’s first term, and Ashley Tellis,
who had been his Senior Policy Advisor in New Delhi 29. Indeed, the policy shift bears
all the signs of a top-down administrative directive specifically designed to circumvent
the inter-agency review process and to minimize input from any remnants of the
nonproliferation lobby 30.
However, it seems that members of Congress have swallowed their pique. In
November 2005 the US Senate overwhelmingly, and more importantly, with
bipartisan support, passed enabling legislation allowing the deal to go forward. The
Senate legislation now must be matched to the House version, which passed in July
2006 by a vote of 359 to 68; both chambers then must approve the final language in
what is known as the “conference stage.” The package will not move forward until
both houses agree to specifics of a nuclear-cooperation accord with India. India will
also have to work out a complementary deal with the IAEA with regards to
inspections and reporting.
Section Seven: Canadian options
While the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 took the world by surprise, Canadians had
already been severely discomfited by India’s nuclear ambitions. In May 1974, the
Indian government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, detonated a nuclear device
with the claimed yield of 12 KT at the Pokharan testing site in the Rajasthan desert.
The fissile material for the explosion came originally from the CIRUS reactor near
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Bombay. Canada had supplied this CANDU-type reactor in the 1960s under very
loosely worded safeguards, while the heavy water to fuel it was provided by the US.
CIRUS was in fact named to recognize the contributions of Canada, India and the US.
As the dangers of unlimited nuclear co-operation became clearer, Canadian officials
had pressed India to accept greater constraints on the disposition of the spent fuel from
CIRUS, but had not made much progress by 1974. After the May 1974 explosion,
which India insisted on describing as a ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’, Canada first
suspended all nuclear ties. A full review of all Canadian nuclear agreements was
conducted, and led to their comprehensive overhaul. Co-operation with India was of
course particularly difficult, especially after India refused to subject all reactors to
multilateral safeguards, and was finally ended in May 1976.
In subsequent years, co-operation was resumed in an ad hoc and limited manner.
Concerns among Canadian engineers and scientists about safety at CANDU-type
reactors led them to confront the proliferation hard-liners. In 1989 the former obtained
approval to help India with the sole purpose of ensuring reactor safety. The Indian
government for its part, was wary of allowing foreign inspections.
In the meantime, Canadian officials had also worked hard to establish their country’s
reputation as a solid pillar of the nonproliferation regime. The emphasis on ‘human
security’ concerns after the end of the Cold War and the persistent use of nuclear
weapons as bargaining chips by the US only made Canada more determined to speak
up for the interests of the regime. Thus, although India and Canada have diversified
and deepened their relationship in recent years, the nuclear issue has been off the table
(albeit a background irritant).
A major shift in Canadian foreign policy followed on the heels of the July 2005
agreement between India and the US, as symbolized by the Pettigrew statement.
However, the relationship between India and Canada is certainly more fraught than the
one that India enjoys with the US. India has chosen to permanently shut down the
CIRUS reactor in 2010. This would ensure that Canada’s original concern would be
mitigated. Yet there are other issues of concern for Canadians.
First, Canada is a signatory to the NPT and a member of the NSG and as discussed
above, entering into an exchange of technologies with India could be seen as a
violation of those multilateral commitments. Second, and more importantly, Canada’s
carefully nurtured position as a defender of the nonproliferation regime could be
harmed. Shortly after taking office, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, on
being questioned about the deal, avoiding any direct comments but reiterated his
commitment to the NPT 31.
Nevertheless, Canadian leaders might decide that this issue is not worth the stress of
breaking ranks with the US, and choose to render support to the Americans when they
31

“Canada to review civilian nuclear understanding with India: Harper”, Khaleej Times, 16 March 2006

Karthika Sasikumar
16
14 February 2007
Submission to International Journal
face questions at the NSG and other forums. In the larger sense, Canada may also
consider this support to be essential to become a part of a new strategic alliance in
Asia, as David Frum counsels32. The nuclear issue has, of course, tremendous
symbolic significance for bilateral ties, so nuclear co-operation would be consistent
with the Canadian focus on ‘Chindia’ (China and India) or ‘Jandia’ (Japan and India)
in economic strategy. Moreover, as the CANDU project struggles to overcome its
technical problems in time to profit from the next wave of nuclear commerce,
establishing an alliance with Indian scientists and engineers may seem like a good
idea.
Conclusion
In many ways, it is premature to discuss the implications of the India-US nuclear
cooperation agreement since the final version of the deal has not been drawn up. It is
possible, although improbable, that disagreements over specific provisions would
derail the agreement. For example, questions are bound to be raised about the
inclusion of specific reactors or plants on the civilian and military lists; India currently
uses the limited uranium enrichment capacity available at the Rare Materials Plant for
producing fuel for nuclear submarine reactors. Since this plant can be upgraded to
produce weapons-grade uranium, the US could demand that India place this facility on
the civilian list 33. Such a conversion would not only restrict fissile material production
but also cripple India’s ‘blue water Navy’ plans. Yet, because the deal is one of such
far-reaching importance, this paper has attempted a preliminary investigation of the
motives behind it and its possible repercussions.
In its attempt to construct itself as a rising power and a responsible one, India has
found many allies. Even the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Mohamed El Baradei came out in support of the deal, calling it an instance of
“out of the box thinking” 34. The remarkable level of support for accepting and tacitly
recognizing India’s nuclear weapons is a riddle that deserves to be answered. I have
tried to show that the answer must include the adroit Indian diplomatic strategy of
drawing on international norms.
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